Th members ! the treaty orgar!.:.atton a r c~ the Phtlippines, Thailand, Pakis tan, Australia , New ~ealand, France, the Unttcd Kmgdom and the United States .
Eicht member nations, and only thret..: of th~m Asian, ttlay s~.: m to be an insignificar t nu.nber {cor a Southeastern Asia treat)', but it lS sufiici\!nl to start a v ry substantial defens.:! build-up aga inst the Commumst menace in Asia. Admittedly, we would have been glad if there were more Asian members, but the door is not closed to them . Whcncv, r thc&e nations, within the C"Onfincs of the treaty area, wish to avail themselves of the opportunity to join, they may do so, the only prerequisite being the concurrence of the present members .
As a dari!ying note, I will say that th~ name o f any future members will be suomitted to the Scnat..:: for approval .
''lhcn the delegations met in Manila, prhJr to the signing of this momt ntous document, the delegates had three major ar..:-as in which tn find solutiono: the dcfinilion of thl: tr .. aty area, how nntch cmphasiG ~( > 1 1.cc on the probh m of subversion, and the l:Conomic clause, if there was i:o L ... one.
The treaty area is ddined in the treaty itself and also in a protocol to the treaty which brings in Laos, Camuodia, and tltc free portion of Vietnam as treaty territory which, if attad cd, would be under the protection of the treaty . Those nations themselves are not members of the Manila Pact. The reason is that the armistice p r ovisions at Geneva at least raised a question in the :ninds of some of the parties to those agrccm nts as to whether the Associated States could actually join such a pact. Nevertheless, those states welcomed the fact that the mantle of p1·ot •. ctivn of the Treaty was thrown around this arl;a.
Broadly speaking, the treaty area includes the territory of the parties and the Pacific Ocean area which is south of 21 degrees anu 30 minutes; that is a line which runs north of the Philippines . The area therefore is Pakir:tan, Thailand and l>y protocol, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia, :rvlalaya, Austr ali:-t, New Zealand and the Philippines . This treaty docs not cove r the Hong Kong ar~a. Formosa, Jal-Jan or Ko r ea.
The major difference in this t r 0aty from any otlwr security treaty is that it placl:S 1 1ore e -,phasis on the danger of subversion . what is said in this respect will constitute a deterrent against such an act 0f aggression .
The problem of subve r sion is dealt with more spccific,~l.y t-han in any other tr~aty. Cubversion in this area is very stronr. and it has t-,,, : : ecogt'ized as such. The signatories are planning a mee t ing in Bangkok la~~.: ~·1~:=: mN.th at which time they can begin to think of ways and means to meet the s·t·)versivc threat which is recognized by the t r~a ty as being a par ticul ar danger i:1 this area.
The proposal before the Senate is a significant new undertaking providing for mutual aid to prevent and counter subversive activity directed from the outside against the territorial integrity and political stability of the member states. The situation, in Indochina in particular, is by no means satis fa c to r y at the present time although it is improvinr,, and it is hoped that somethin g fruitful will come from the l3angl•.ok rqcelinp,. r. President, as my colleagues here kt ov. , 1t is n t n ccssary for the Pacific Cha rter to be submitted to the Senate fo r a c tio n.
One of the first questions to arise out of nny discussion of thi s th w The h.:ss contro\',;rsial language d ec lares that an intrusion in the tr ea t y area would be dang.::rous to our peace and scc· tri ty and that we \/Ould, in that event, act to meet th e common dange r in accor,lancc with ou r constitutional ...
t -p roc esses . The r-rj\ T~ treaty says that "au attack on one is an attack on all.
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The fo r "ne r m ay not be as automatic, depending on the circumstances, but it avoids any constitutional controversy and it 5te.ns fr om one of our o ldes t for eign policies, the :.'-1rn r ce Doctrine . in the P acific ar e a. I sincerely hope th at the fJcn ate will give its p.:01 •1-S appr oval and ratification . of the treaty area, wish to avail themselves of the opportunity to join, they may do so, the only prerequisite being the concurrence of the present members .
As a clarifying note, I will say that th~ name of any future members will be submitted to the Senate for approval. The problem of subversion is do..!alt with mo r e specific.ll.y tl'-an in any other treaty. Subversion in thin a·rca is very stronlj and it has 1:.:( :-:-ecognized as such. The signatories arc planning a meeting in Bangkok late:: th~c:; mcr·.th at which time they can begin to think of ways and means to meet the s:.1bve r sive threat which is rccL'gnizcd by the treaty as being a particul ar danger in this area .
The proposal before the Senate is a significant new under t aking pr ovidins for mutual aid to prevent and counter subversive activity directed fr om the outside against the territorial integrity and political stability of the member states . The situation, in Indochina in particular, is by no means satisfac tory at the present time although it is impr oving , and it is hoped that something fruitful will come from the Bangtok mce(ing. The situation in Europe after \''orld Wa1· 11 was quit~:: dH:fcrcnt than the one which exists in Asia today. In Eu r op'.: our aiu programs hclpc<l to recreate something that had been destroyed . 'c were working with peopl who were well v\.:rscd in industrial life and th y n(!cded a big hoost to get on their feet again.
In Asia the problem is to create something that is totally new . Our first problem und(!r this clause is to find a proper means to help before su r:; of money arc requested. There aru a number of economic probicrr.s of acute necessity in Southeast Asia, particularly in free Vh::tnam . It is -., :mderstanding thal a r<·porl will be forthcoming from the Admini.,tration \Jhen -;. l\;=.l"lit 1lun of approach has lH'cn formulated . ThiG proposal merely rc cog:'\~"": ::; . 1 h! cc no :1ic problc."t"' and lays the ground wor:~.
The tr~aly ends with a declaration that the armed aggrcssio:1 '''.ich is referred to and which the United Stat.:!s declares would be dangerous to its own peace and S\.:Curity would be Communist aggl'cssion. The l e ss controversial language dl..!clarcs that an intrusiou in the tr cn ty area would be dang e rous to our peace and security Clnd that we would, in that event, act to meet th e common danger in accordance with o ur c ountitulio nal out the fo rm that the treaty was to t a ke .
In conclusion I wish to stress agaiu the importance of 1.:: s ''-·~;,< y <..'1'! the Pacific Charter. They ar c needed steps in building secnrhy ··; ' 0 ~: -. ::: ~I l l ! in the Pacific a rea . I sinc(' r e ly hope that the Sc;nate w ill give its p.ront t approval and ratification.
